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Abstract 
This paper investigates the scope of indirect network effects in the home video game 
industry.  We argue that the increasing prevalence of non-exclusive software gives rise to 
indirect network effects that exist between users of competing and incompatible hardware 
platforms.  This is because software non-exclusivity, like hardware compatibility, allows 
a software firm to sell to a market broader than a single platform’s installed base, leading 
to a dependence of any particular platform’s software on all firms’ installed bases.  We 
look for evidence of these market-wide network effects by estimating a model of 
hardware demand and software supply.  Our software supply equation allows the supply 
of games for a particular platform to depend not only on the installed base of that 
platform, but also on the installed base of competing platforms.  Our results indicate the 
presence of both a platform-specific network effect and – in recent years – a cross-
platform (or generation-wide) network effect.  Our finding that the scope of indirect 
network effects in this industry has widened suggests one reason that this market, which 
is often cited as a canonical example of one with strong indirect network effects, is no 
longer dominated by a single platform.   
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I. Introduction 
The home video game market has long been recognized as one in which network 
effects exist. As in many high-tech industries, these network effects are indirect.  Home 
video games systems consist of a console (the hardware) and games that can be played on 
that console (the software).  Because the value of a console is derived from the games 
that can be played on it, consumers prefer to buy a system with a greater variety of 
software. Because there are fixed costs to developing software, game publishers prefer to 
develop games for a console with a large base of users.  Thus, consumers’ value of a 
particular console depends positively – though indirectly – on the number of other users 
of that console. 
This paper explores the scope of indirect network effects in the home video game 
industry.  While previous work has assumed that network effects exist only between users 
of a given console (for example, Clements and Ohashi (2005)), we argue that in recent 
years network effects have also come to exist between users of competing platforms in 
the same technological generation. Interestingly, this change in the scope of indirect 
network effects has occurred without any change in the degree of hardware compatibility. 
Home video games systems have always been, and continue to be, incompatible with one 
another.  As Katz and Shapiro (1985) explain, the scope of indirect network effects in an 
industry is typically determined by the degree of hardware compatibility.  For example, if 
all hardware brands are incompatible network effects will operate at the brand level, 
while if all brands are compatible network effects will operate at the market level.  
Hardware compatibility is the relevant consideration in assessing the scope of indirect 
effects because it determines the size of the potential market that a software firm can 
appeal to when trying to recoup its fixed costs of software development. That is, the 
degree of hardware compatibility determines the set of technologies whose users are 
potential purchasers of a given piece of software.  
While changes in the degree of compatibility between video game systems have not 
been responsible for the change in the scope of network effects in this industry, we 
believe that changes in the degree of software exclusivity have.  Over the past 20 years, 
the fraction of games titles that are released on more than one console has increased from 
about 12% to almost 40%.  Just as compatible hardware allows software providers to 
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spread the fixed costs of software development over multiple brands, non-exclusive 
software allows providers to spread the fixed costs of development over multiple 
platforms.  Software providers considering a multi-platform title will compare these fixed 
costs (plus the fixed costs of porting the game across platforms) to the revenue that can 
be earned by selling the game to users of all of the platforms on which the game will be 
released.  Thus, once non-exclusive software is considered, the supply of games for any 
particular platform will clearly depend not only on the number of users of that platform, 
but also on the number of users of other platforms on which those games could be 
released.  This gives rise to indirect network effects between users of incompatible video 
game consoles.1   
Following existing work in this area, we will look for evidence of indirect network 
effects by estimating two relationships: (1) the relationship between hardware demand 
and software variety; and (2) the relationship between software availability and the 
installed base of hardware.  Our analysis uses monthly data on U.S. hardware sales and 
software availability for all major home video game systems from 1995-2005.   
We begin by specifying a standard discrete choice model of hardware demand.  One 
important benefit of this demand model is that it allows us to account for both exclusive 
and non-exclusive software in a straightforward way.  In particular, exclusive and non-
exclusive titles need not be distinguished in the utility function because consumers’ 
utility from having a particular game available on a console does not depend on whether 
that game is available on other consoles.  Of course, whether a game is exclusive will 
affect the relative utilities of different consoles and, in turn, their market shares.  The 
nested logit model that we use accounts directly for this, as each console’s market share 
is a function of the characteristics of all products in the market.  We can then use these 
market share expressions to illustrate the differential effects that exclusive and non-
exclusive titles have on demand.   
We then estimate a reduced-form software supply equation that accounts for the 
possibility of both console-specific and cross-console indirect network effects.  We allow 
                                                 
1 In fact, the theory literature (for example, Katz and Shapiro (1985) and Farrell and Saloner (1992)) has 
long recognized that this kind of indirect network effect can span incompatible platforms in the presence of 
technologies such as adapters and converters. The empirical literature has largely ignored this possibility, at 
least in part because the industries studied have typically been characterized by complete compatibility 
(e.g., CD players) or complete incompatibility (e.g., early home video games). 
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the supply of games for a particular console to depend on both the installed base of that 
console and the installed base of competing consoles in the same technological 
generation.  By including this additional installed base measure in the supply equation, 
we allow for the possibility that the installed base of competing (and incompatible) 
hardware platforms can increase the supply of games for a console because the fixed 
costs of non-exclusive releases can be spread across users of multiple platforms.  
Furthermore, we will allow the coefficient on the competitors’ installed base term to vary 
over time to capture the fact that software publishers’ incentives to produce non-
exclusive software have increased.  As we explain in greater detail in the next section, we 
believe that a rise in the importance of licensed content and other content costs that are 
not platform-specific, a decrease in “porting” costs, and a rise in the size and 
sophistication of independent game publishers have increased the attractiveness of non-
exclusive releases.  As the attractiveness of multi-platform releases increases, the scope 
of indirect network effects at work in the industry broadens.  Our software supply 
specification allows us to measure this effect.  
 Our empirical results support the existence of both a significant platform-level 
indirect network effect and an increasingly important generation-level network effect.  
The results of the demand estimation indicate that the demand for a particular console 
increases with the availability of software for that console.  Furthermore, as expected, 
exclusive games have a larger impact on demand than non-exclusive games.  The results 
from the software supply equation indicate that the supply of games for a console 
depends positively on the installed base on that console. The supply of games for a 
console also depends on the installed base of other consoles, with this relationship being 
negative early in our data and positive in later generations. This implies a positive 
indirect network effect operates at the generation level by the end of the period we study. 
The video game market is often cited as the canonical example of a “tippy” 
market – one in which indirect network effects lead to dominance by a single firm.  The 
complete dominance of the industry by Nintendo’s NES system in the 1980s and early 
1990s is often cited as evidence for this claim.2  However, with successive technological 
generations, this market has become significantly less dominated by any single console.  
                                                 
2 See, for example, Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996), pp. 111-117, or Shapiro and Varian (1999), p. 178. 
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Indeed, in each of the two most recent technological generations, three competing 
platforms (those of Nintendo, Sony, and Microsoft) have retained sizable market shares 
(see Figure 1).3  While we do not estimate a dynamic model and therefore cannot use our 
results to illustrate how changes in software exclusivity affect the evolution of market 
shares over time, we believe that our empirical results provide at least suggestive 
evidence as to why this market has become less prone to tipping.  Our results indicate 
that non-exclusive software affects a market much in the same way that compatibility 
does – it changes the scope of indirect network effects.  If network effects exist across 
users of different platforms, as our results indicate, then it should be no surprise that the 
tendency of this market to tip towards a single platform has fallen. At the end of Section 
V, we use our demand and supply estimates to carry out a simple exercise that illustrates 
how the presence of generation-wide network effects lowers the benefit that a console 
manufacturer gets from stimulating software provision.   
 This paper builds on a small but growing literature that seeks to estimate the role 
of indirect network effects in a variety of technology industries.  It is most closely related 
to two recent papers that estimate network effects in the home video game industry.  
Clements and Ohashi (2005) estimate the effectiveness of console price and software 
variety as alternate ways of stimulating hardware demand.  Their empirical analysis 
implicitly treats all software as exclusive to a platform.  Thus, they do not distinguish 
between the introduction of exclusive and non-exclusive games in calculating demand 
elasticities nor do they allow for the possibility of cross-platform effects in their supply 
equation.  Their data end several years earlier than ours, before the trend towards non-
exclusive software had fully manifested itself (they state that, in their sample, 17% of 
titles are available on more than one platform), so the effect we focus on may not have 
been operative in their data in any case.  Their focus is instead on the dynamics of 
indirect network effects and the evolution and price and software elasticities over a 
console’s lifecycle.   
                                                 
3 Figure 1 shows the long-run installed base (IB) market shares of the major platforms in each technological 
generation.  We define a platform’s “long-run” IB market share as its IB market share in the month in 
which the first major platform of the next generation is launched.  We believe that the launch of the next 
generation acts as a good signal that the previous generation has reached a point of maturation.   
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 Prieger and Hu (2006) also estimate indirect network effects in the video game 
industry.  They acknowledge the presence of both exclusive and non-exclusive software 
and, in fact, are interested in testing whether indirect network effects are stronger for 
exclusive games.  However, they approach this question by explicitly separating 
exclusive and non-exclusive games in the consumer utility function (which, as described 
above, we do not believe is the appropriate way to approach this question).  Perhaps not 
surprisingly, they do not get sensible results from this specification.    Other papers that 
explicitly estimate indirect network effects in technology industries by modeling the 
complementarities between hardware and software include Gandal, Kende, and Rob 
(2000) in the CD market and Nair, Chintagunta, and Dube (2004) in the personal digital 
assistant market.4
 Our paper contributes to this literature by being the first to explicitly consider the 
role of software exclusivity and its impact on the scope of indirect network effects.  Our 
analysis indicates that the scope of indirect network effects depends on more than just 
hardware compatibility.  Rather, the scope of these effects is determined by software 
providers’ ability to share fixed costs across platforms – which is possible if the platforms 
are compatible, but is also possible if the costs of porting software across incompatible 
platforms are relatively low.  This research draws attention to the fact that features of the 
software market can also affect the scope of indirect network effects and, in turn, the 
likelihood that a market tips towards a single dominant platform.  Moreover, it raises the 
possibility that hardware providers may have incentives either to sign contracts for 
exclusive software or to engineer their hardware to affect the costs of porting software 
across platforms.5
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, we 
provide relevant background information on the industry. Section III describes the 
                                                 
4 There also exists a related empirical literature on “two-sided markets” (building on theoretical work by 
Rochet and Tirole (2003) and Armstrong (2005)).  For example, Rysman (2004) estimates equations for 
readership and advertising demand in the “yellow pages” market, with multiple directories competing for 
readership and advertising dollars in many cities.  Kaiser and Wright (2006) study the magazine industry 
using a similar approach.  
5 In fact, two recent theory papers (Hogendorn and Yuen (2007) and Mantena, Sankaranarayanan, and 
Viswanathan (2007)) focus on precisely this incentive for the console manufacturer to contract for the 
provision of exclusive complements and illuminate the tension between the software provider’s desire to 
serve a large market and the console manufacturer’s desire to differentiate its product through the provision 
of unique complements. 
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empirical approach.  Section IV describes the data.  Our results are presented in Section 
V.  A final section concludes.  
 
II. Industry Background 
The home video game market is comprised of a small number of competing, 
incompatible video game systems (or “platforms”). A video game system consists of 
hardware (a console that is attached to a television set) and software (game titles on either 
cartridge or CD).  Software produced for a given hardware platform cannot be played on 
an alternate platform; however, as described above, distinct versions of the same software 
title may be produced for multiple hardware platforms.   
Platforms with similar technological characteristics are grouped into 
“generations” by industry observers. There have been seven generations of platforms in 
the “modern” home video game industry, spanning 1975 to the present.  We focus our 
analysis on the years 1995 to 2005 inclusive.  This time period covers the launch of most 
of the platforms in generations five and all of the platforms in generation six.  It also 
includes several platforms from generations three and four which were still actively 
selling during this period.6  Table 1 presents the platforms that are included in our 
sample, grouped into generations.  The table also shows their date of introduction and 
basic technological characteristics. Three technical factors determine the quality of a 
home video game system: (1) instruction word length (in bits) of either the central 
processor (CPU) or graphics processor (GPU); (2) clock speed (in MHz); and (3) the 
amount of RAM (in MHz).  As the table indicates, platforms within a generation are 
typically quite similar on these three characteristics.   
Each video game platform is controlled by what we call a “console manufacturer” 
and, as is evident from Table 1, many of the same console manufacturers appear in each 
successive generation (after the firm’s initial entry, of course).7 In addition to developing 
the hardware and operating system, a console manufacturer typically also produces some 
                                                 
6 We ignore handheld game devices and PC games. 
7 Note that while we use the term “console manufacturer”, it is control of the operating system, rather than 
literal manufacturing of the hardware, that is relevant for our purposes. For example, Sony is the console 
manufacturer for the PlayStation2. This means that Sony owns the operating system for this platform and is 
responsible for the R&D that goes into the development and maintenance of PlayStation2 platform. 
Whether Sony outsources manufacturing of some or all of the components of the hardware is of no 
consequence for our purposes. 
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software that will run on this platform (so-call “in-house” or “first-party” titles). The 
console manufacturer will also enter into contracts with independent software publishers 
to provide games for the platform (known as “third-party” titles).  Software publishers 
finance the development of the game (including obtaining and paying for any licensed 
content the game may use) and perform the marketing and distribution of the title.  Game 
development (the actual programming) may be carried out by a development team 
internal to the publisher or may be contracted out to an independent game developer.  
Contracts between console manufacturers and software publishers generally stipulate that 
the console manufacturer is to provide software development tools to the publisher, while 
the publisher agrees to protect this intellectual property. The console manufacturer retains 
the right to approve games before they are developed and released for the console.  The 
contract also specifies the per-unit royalties to be paid by the publisher to the console 
manufacturer.  Finally, the contract may specify whether or not the game under 
development is exclusive to the console manufacturer. 
As mentioned in the Introduction, over the past 20 years, this industry has seen a 
significant increase in the prevalence of non-exclusive software.  In Tables 2A and 2B, 
we document this change in software exclusivity, first at the generation level and then at 
the platform level.  Note that in Table 2A, the level of observation is the title rather than 
the platform-title.  These trends would be even more pronounced if reported at the 
platform-title level since non-exclusive games would be double- or triple-counted 
depending on the number of platforms they were released for.8  Table 2A indicates that 
there has been a significant decrease in software exclusivity.  88% of titles released in 
generation three were released for only a single platform.  By generation six, only 61% 
were exclusive to a platform.9  The trend in these averages has not been monotonic, 
however, as a greater fraction of generation five games than generation four games were 
exclusive.  This is due at least in part to changes in the composition of console 
manufacturers from generation to generation. Specifically, Sony first entered the industry 
                                                 
8 For example, suppose there are three titles with the first being exclusive to one platform, the second being 
exclusive to the other platform and the third being available on both platforms.  Then the fraction of titles 
that are exclusive is two-thirds while the fraction of title-platforms that are exclusive is one-half. 
9 When we use platform-titles as the level of observation, we calculate that while 81% of platform-titles in 
generation three were exclusive, only 37% of platform-titles in generation six were. 
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in generation 5 and accounted for the majority of games in that generation. As Table 2B 
shows, Sony has also generally had a higher proportion of exclusive games than other 
console manufacturers.  
Since exclusive titles are often games that the console manufacturer publishes 
itself (i.e. in-house games), one might wonder whether the observed decrease in the 
extent of exclusive software is simply reflecting a decrease in the prevalence of in-house 
games.  To investigate this, the next row of Table 2A calculates the fraction of titles that 
are exclusive to a single platform, looking only at titles developed by third-party 
publishers.  These numbers indicate that the fall in exclusive titles is not due to a 
reduction in in-house publishing.  The fraction of third-party titles that are exclusive to a 
single console is also decreasing over this period.   
In Table 2B, we show the fraction of each console’s games that are exclusive.  
This table is useful for highlighting differences in exclusivity across consoles as well as 
differences in exclusivity across successive consoles produced by the same parent (i.e., 
differences across Nintendo’s various systems).  For example, the table indicates that 
both Nintendo’s and Sony’s generations five consoles had a substantially higher fraction 
of exclusive titles than their generation six consoles.   
The patterns apparent in Table 2A and 2B clearly beg the question of why non-
exclusive software has become more prevalent in this industry.  While not the focus of 
this research in the sense that we are interested in estimating the effects of changes in 
exclusivity on the scope of network effects (and not explaining the change in exclusivity), 
it is important to briefly discuss what may be causing this trend.  To motivate this 
discussion, we consider the incentive of a software publisher to release a game for one or 
more platforms. 
Suppose that there are two consoles in the market.  If a software publisher 
releases a game that is exclusive to one of these consoles, he earns revenues from the sale 
of that game to users of that console, incurs the fixed costs of developing the game and 
pays royalties to the console manufacturer for each unit of the game produced.  If the 
publisher instead releases the game on both consoles, he earns revenues from the sale of 
the game to users of both consoles, incurs the fixed costs of the developing the game as 
well as the fixed costs of porting the game to the second console, and pays royalties to 
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both console manufacturers (which may be higher than the royalties paid on the exclusive 
game if the console manufacturer offers a lower royalty rate in exchange for exclusivity).   
The publisher will prefer to develop the game for both consoles if the additional revenue 
from selling to users of the second platform exceeds the additional fixed costs (i.e., the 
“porting” costs) and the additional licensing fees.  Note that as the fixed costs of 
developing a game increase and/or the fixed costs of a porting a game decrease, games 
may increasingly be profitable as multi-platform releases but not as exclusive releases.  
Based on our reading of the trade press and other industry sources, we believe that 
changes in the cost structure and technology of game development, an increase in the use 
of licensed content in games, and changes in the structure of the software industry all 
influence software publishers’ incentives to develop non-exclusive games.  Figure 2 
shows one industry analyst’s estimate of game development costs over the past 25 years.  
This figure is roughly consistent with data we have seen elsewhere that estimates the 
average cost of game development in generation five was around $1 million, while the 
average cost of game development in generation six was $5-7 million (Loftus, 2006).  As 
illustrated by the discussion above, when the fixed costs of game development increase, 
more projects become viable only when they reach a very large audience—larger perhaps 
than any one platform can provide. In order to recoup these massive development costs, 
publishers have an incentive to release a title on multiple platforms. 
The composition of development costs has also changed in important ways. With 
the rise to dominance of the CD-based console in generation five, games have become 
relatively more “content”-intensive. CDs make it cheaper to store vast quantity of 
graphical and musical data in a game, compared to the prior technology that used 
semiconductor chip-based cartridges. As a consequence, a larger fraction of the 
development costs has become attributable to tasks like music licensing or composition 
and performance, motion-capture studies, background art and design (see Loftus (2006) 
and Reimer (2005)). Since these costs are not specific to a platform (for example, music 
is not operating system-specific), the fraction of initial development costs that must be 
duplicated in order to port a game to a second platform have shrunk.  In addition, porting 
costs have fallen because of the rise of sophisticated cross-platform development tools 
called “middleware” that can dramatically reduce the costs of writing a game for multiple 
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platforms compared to the traditional complete rewrite (Reimer, 2005).10 Middleware 
allows specific technical aspects of the game—for example, 3-D animation—to be 
developed within a programming tool that can provide output usable by the operating 
systems of more than one platform. In sum, the technology of game development has 
changed so that more of the initial costs incurred when writing a game for its first 
platform are avoidable in porting the game for a second. This reduction in the relative 
cost of porting clearly increases the attractiveness of nonexclusive releases.11
 Furthermore, as shown in Table 2A, software publishers are increasingly relying 
on licensed content and sequels. Industry observers attribute this to an attempt to mitigate 
risk of failure in an environment with skyrocketing development costs (Reimer, 2005). 
This move to a “blockbuster” model mimics an often cited development in Hollywood 
filmmaking, which experienced a similar simultaneous run-up in production budgets and 
increased reliance on sequels. Not only may ballooning budgets make the relative 
predictability of a licensed game seem attractive, but it also introduces another player into 
the game development process. If the owner of the relevant intellectual property (e.g., the 
Batman franchise) is pursuing a broad, multi-product or multi-channel strategy for 
disseminating its content and building/exploiting its brand, and if there are spillovers 
across markets (e.g., video game sales stimulate action-figure sales), it may provide 
publishers with incentives (perhaps with lower licensing fees) to develop a non-exclusive 
game based on its content (even if, in the narrow context of video games sales alone, it 
might be more profitable to license its content for development exclusively on one 
platform).   
One final change that might have facilitated the rise in nonexclusive games is the 
growth and maturation of the software publishing industry, which could contribute to the 
decline in the proportion of (almost always exclusive) in-house games evident in the third 
row of Table 2A. The final row of Table 2A shows that the average number of titles 
released by an independent publisher has grown more than three-fold over this period. As 
game development has increasingly become financed by publishers rather than by 
developers, and as development costs have soared, publishers have grown larger and 
                                                 
10 Also see the “Porting in gaming” entry in Wikipedia. 
11 Mantena, Sankaranarayanan and Viswanathan (2007) state that industry figures indicate that porting 
costs are now typically in the range of 15% to 25% of the initial development costs. 
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better capitalized, with a number of the largest becoming publicly traded. This should 
correct some capital market imperfections likely present in the industry’s earlier days and 
make in-house publishing less necessary as a means of stimulating software development 
due to lack of financing. Of course, there may be other reasons that console 
manufacturers wish to be involved in in-house publishing, but the relative increase in the 
independent provision of games may be in part due to this development. And, since in-
house games are almost always exclusive (apparently because console manufacturers are 
reluctant to share their IP and development tools with rival platforms, in addition to the 
fact that it may in their interest to stimulate platform-specific demand), a rise in 
independent publishing may increase the prevalence of non-exclusive games. 
 
III. Empirical Approach 
 Indirect network effects can be estimated in two ways.  One can treat them as 
direct network effects and estimate a direct relationship between the demand for a given 
hardware platform and its installed base (see Ohashi (2003) for an example).  Or, one can 
explicitly account for the feedback between hardware and software by estimating both a 
hardware demand equation (in which hardware demand depends on software availability) 
and a software supply equation (in which software supply depends on the installed base 
of hardware).  Finding a positive effect of software availability on hardware demand and 
a positive effect of hardware installed base on software supply establishes the (indirect) 
positive relationship between the demand for a hardware platform and the existing 
number of users of that hardware. This is the basic approach followed in the existing 
literature cited above, and we employ it as well.  However, as we describe in the next two 
subsections, we modify it to account for the changing scope of indirect network effects in 
this industry.  
 
III.A. Hardware demand 
We model a consumer’s choice of which (if any) hardware platform to buy in a 
given month as a discrete choice problem in which the consumer evaluates the utility that 
he would receive from each potential platform and chooses the one platform that 
maximizes his utility. We include an explicit outside good so that consumers also have 
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the option of buying none of the platforms.  Following Berry (1994), consumer i’s utility 
from purchasing console j, in month t is written as, 
(1)     tij
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where  is a vector of observed characteristics for console j in month t,  is the price 
of console j in month t,  is a measure of software availability for console j in month 
t,  is a vector of unobserved (to the econometrician) characteristics for console j in  
month t (such as marketing or brand image), and  is an idiosyncratic error term.  Each 
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The coefficient γ  measures the relationship between hardware demand and 
software availability.  We expect 0>γ , meaning that greater software availability on 
platform j increases a consumer’s utility from console j.  Because of data limitations, in 
most of our specifications we have to assume that consumers care only about the number 
of titles available for the console and not about the quality of those titles.  But, because 
we know that there is, in fact, significant heterogeneity in the quality of games (and, 
indeed, only a small number of titles actually become “hits”), we also employ some 
quality-adjusted software measures as robustness checks. 
Continuing to follow Berry (1994), we let  denote the 
mean valuation of console j across all consumers, meaning we can interpret  as the 
difference between consumer i’s valuation of console j in month t and the mean 
valuation. The distribution assumed for  determines the choice probabilities and 
substitution patterns.  We adopt a nested logit framework and group all inside goods (i.e.: 
all consoles) into one nest and the outside good into another. This allows for correlation 
in  across the inside goods, allowing them to be closer substitutes with each other than 
they are with the outside good.  As Berry (1994) shows, with these assumptions on  
and by setting the mean utility of the outside good to zero, the following linear estimating 
equation for one-level nested logit can be derived, 
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where,  is console j’s within-group share (this is console j’s share of all consumers 
who purchase any console in month t) and  is the econometric error term.  In our 
empirical specifications, we divide  into a time invariant component, which we will 
estimate as a platform fixed effect, and a time-varying component.
gjs /
t
jξ
t
jξ
12  We also include 
dummy variables to control for the month of the year.  These capture the fact that the 
perceived quality of all consoles may be higher in some months such as November and 
December, when parents are purchasing gifts for children.  Furthermore, we control for 
the age of the console (with either polynomials or dummy variables) to capture how 
perceived and actual quality changes with a console’ age.13  Finally, in some 
specifications we replace the separate platform and age effects with platform-age fixed 
effects.  This is our most flexible specification in the sense that these fixed effects control 
for the unobserved quality of each platform in each year of its “life”. 
 It is worthwhile to highlight the way in which non-exclusive software (i.e.: game 
titles available on multiple competing platforms) affects the demand analysis.  Exclusive 
and nonexclusive software titles do not need to be distinguished from one another in the 
data or in equation (2).  This is because the right-hand side of equation (2) is literally the 
mean utility that a consumer receives from purchasing product j.  As is evident from the 
utility function in (1), whether or not a particular game is exclusive to console j has no 
impact on the utility that a consumer derives from console j.  That is, when evaluating his 
utility from a given console, a consumer will consider the games that can be played on 
that console, but not whether or not those same titles are also available on other consoles.  
However, whether or not software is exclusive to a console will affect the relative 
utilities of the different alternatives and therefore which console a consumer ultimately 
chooses. Games that are available on multiple platforms will increase the utility the 
consumer gets from each of those platforms and will, in turn, have little effect on the 
probability that the consumer chooses one of those platforms over another. On the other 
                                                 
12 Because we include platform fixed effects, the marginal utility of platforms characteristics which do not 
change over time (for example, whether the platform is cartridge or CD based) will not be separately 
identified.   
13 For example, consumers may use console age as a signal for how much longer they expect software 
writers to produce software for that console.  Alternatively, other types of complementary products may 
emerge for a console (such as, gaming websites or magazines that offer “tips”) as it ages.  The age variables 
will pick up both of these things. 
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hand, an exclusive title will increase the likelihood that a consumer chooses a particular 
platform.   
 Given this, one way to illustrate the different effects that exclusive and non-
exclusive software have is to calculate separate derivatives of demand with respect to 
exclusive and non-exclusive software.14  When calculating the change in demand in 
response to a change in exclusive software, the change in software will affect only the 
attributes and utility of platform j.  In contrast, when calculating the change in demand 
with respect to non-exclusive software, the change in software will affect both the 
attributes of platform j as well as the attributes of all other platform on which this game is 
available.  In a logit model, the demand for any product depends on the characteristics of 
all products in the market; therefore, an increase in exclusive software will clearly have a 
larger effect on demand than an increase in non-exclusive software.  
 
III.B. Software supply 
 Our supply equation generally follows the previous literature, with modifications 
that allow us to estimate whether and how the scope of indirect network effects in this 
industry has changed.  In particular, we modify the software supply equation so that we 
can explicitly estimate whether, in successive generations, the installed base of 
competing platforms generates a positive spillover in the production of software for 
platform j.  This would provide evidence that the increase in non-exclusive software acts 
like an increase in compatibility in that it changes the scope of indirect network effects 
from being platform-specific to being generation-specific. 
 We estimate a reduced-form relationship between the variety of software 
available on a platform and that platform’s installed base of hardware.15  Specifically, we 
estimate the following equation,  
(3)   tj
t
j
t
j
t
jj
t
j IBIBZSW ηγγβα ++++= −21)ln(
                                                 
14 Prieger and Hu (2006) try to estimate whether indirect network effects in the video game industry are 
stronger for exclusive than non-exclusive games.  They explicitly distinguish the two types of software in 
the consumer utility function find no difference (if anything, they find that non-unique games have a larger 
effect).  However, given the discussion here, it is clear that there is no reason to expect the utility of the two 
types of games to differ.  Rather, it is their effects on demand that should differ. 
15 This is basically the same reduced form model employed by Clements and Ohashi (2005) and Prieger 
and Hu (2006) in estimating the supply of software. The primary difference is that we allow dependence of 
one platform’s software supply on all platforms’ installed base of hardware. 
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where, jα  is a platform fixed effect,  is a vector of characteristics of console j in 
month t that may affect firms’ incentive to supply software for that console (such as the 
age of the console),  is the installed base of console j in month t,  is the installed 
base of all other consoles in the same technological generation as platform j, and  is an 
error term.  Because we believe that there have been several important technological 
changes in the software side of this industry over the period we study, we control for time 
effects with either year or month dummies.
t
jZ
t
jIB
t
jIB−
t
jη
16  We control platform age because the 
diffusion of knowledge and expertise related to programming for a specific console may 
increase the supply of developers over time. The inclusion of platform and year (or 
month) dummies prevents us from also including platform age dummies (this is the 
common cohort/age/year problem) so we instead include higher order polynomials of 
platform age.17  
 1γ  captures the relationship between the supply of software for platform j and its 
installed base, while 2γ  captures the relationship between the supply of software for 
platform j and its competitors’ (combined) installed base.  We expect 01 >γ , meaning 
that increases in a platform’s installed base stimulate the provision of software for that 
platform.  This is the source of the traditional platform-level indirect network effect. 
 The sign of  2γ  depends on the nature of the technology of software provision. At 
one extreme, imagine that all development costs were completely specific to a platform, 
so that writing a version of the same game to run on a second platform required 
replication of all the same steps and the same costs. If the supply of inputs to this process 
was perfectly elastic, then the decision about whether to write a game for each potential 
platform would be a completely independent decision. A software firm would simply 
calculate the required potential market size and then develop the game for all platforms 
whose installed base (or projected installed base) exceeded that threshold. This would 
imply 2γ =0. Alternatively, if some inputs to the software development process were 
scarce, or less than perfectly elastically supplied, then such a model could imply a  
                                                 
16 These are actual month dummies as opposed to the calendar month dummies we include in the demand 
equation.  Obviously, these month dummies subsume the calendar month dummies; however, we do 
include the calendar month dummies when we include only year effects. 
17 See Hall, Mairesse and Turner (2005) for example.   
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2γ <0—that is, some crowding out of software development based on the growth of rival 
platforms. In this case, the growth of a rival platform is bad news for the focal platform 
because the consequent increase in software development for that platform diverts 
resources away from software development for the focal platform. Under another 
interpretation, software providers might use the installed base of competitors as a signal 
about the likely evolution of platform j; for example, if platform j’s competitors have 
large installed bases, software providers may infer that the market is likely to tip away 
from platform j and avoid writing software for the platform. This would again generate a 
negative spillover on software development from the growth of the installed base of rival 
platforms.  
 Now imagine instead that the portion of the fixed development costs that must be 
replicated to “port” the game to another platform falls. This increases the attractiveness of 
multi-platform releases and introduces the potential for a positive relationship between 
the supply of games for platform j and the installed base of platform k—that is, 2γ >0.  
Specifically, for a software provider who is contemplating writing a game for platform j, 
the installed base of platform k represents an additional set of customers over which the 
fixed costs of this game can be spread.  As the costs of porting games to additional 
platforms fall and/or as the development costs of games increase, games that may not be 
profitable if developed only for platform j might become profitable if developed for 
platforms j and k.  If so, the supply of games for platform j will be directly affected by the 
installed base of platform k.  This would give rise to generation-wide indirect network 
effect, and it is this relationship that we seek to test.  Given the evolution of the gaming 
industry described in section II, we specifically expect 2γ to become more positive (or 
less negative) over time.  We test this hypothesis by allowing the coefficient 2γ to vary by 
generation so that we estimate how the relationship between competitors’ installed base 
and the supply of games for platform j changes over our sample period. 
 We can then combine the parameters of the demand and supply equations to 
establish the existence and scope of indirect network effects in this industry.  In 
particular, a finding of 0>λ  in the demand equation and 01 >γ  in the supply equation 
establishes the presence of a platform-level indirect network effect.  A finding of 0>λ  in 
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the demand equation and 02 >γ  in the supply equation establishes the presence of a 
generation-level indirect network effect.  Moreover, a finding that 2γ increases over 
successive generations in our sample would indicate that the scope of indirect network 
effects has changed from users of the same platform to users of different platforms in the 
same generation.  Note that this change in the scope of indirect network effects can take 
place even in the absence of physical compatibility between the products. 
  
III.C. Endogeneity 
i. Hardware Demand 
 Price, Within Group Share and # of Titles are all potentially endogenous in the 
demand equation.  With the inclusion of platform fixed effects, the error term in the 
demand equation can be interpreted as the deviation of the unobserved quality of 
platform j in month t from its average unobserved quality.  This error term may capture 
several sources of variation in unobserved quality.  First, it may capture changes in 
perceived quality that result from advertising campaigns (since these would occur at 
different points in a platform’s life cycle, they would not be controlled for by the 
platform fixed effects).  Second, it may capture changes in quality that result from the 
release of new information about the platform–for example through positive or negative 
product reviews.  Finally, it may capture changes in quality that result from the 
emergence of complementary products (other than software) that enhance the value of the 
platform – for example, a website that provides “tips” on how to solve games.  Because 
these types of changes in unobserved quality will be considered by firms when setting 
prices and by consumers when making choices, they will likely be correlated with both 
Price and Within Group Share. 
 In addition, if changes in unobserved quality are persistent over time (i.e.: if there 
is serial correlation in the error term in the demand equation), then # of Titles may be 
endogenous as well.  This logic is perhaps best illustrated with an example.  Suppose that 
in month t, platform j has a “high” level of unobserved quality because the platform 
received positive reviews from gaming websites.  This increase in quality will lead to 
higher demand from platform j that month.  This, in turn, will increase the installed base 
of platform j in month t+1 and, through the software supply relationship, increase the 
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supply of games for platform j in month t+1.  If the increase in the unobserved quality of 
platform j persists (i.e., the positive reviews in month t increase the perceived quality of 
platform j in month t+1 as well), then there will be correlations between # of Titles in 
month t+1 and the error term in the demand equation in month t+1.  Because we expect 
that at least some of the time-varying components of unobserved quality may persist for 
more than one month, we treat # of Titles as endogenous. 
   Following Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995), we construct instruments that 
measure the extent of competition faced by a platform as well as the extent to which that 
competition comes from other platforms owned by the same “parent”.  Specifically, our 
instruments include the sum of each hardware characteristic (processor speed, memory, 
and processor word length in bits) over the competing products in the market, the total 
number of competing platforms in the market, the number of competing platforms from 
the same generation, and the number of competing platforms from the same manufacturer 
(i.e., the number of other Nintendo consoles actively selling in the market).  We expect 
that these variables will be correlated with platform j’s price (because they affect 
platform j’s ability to raise prices), platform j’s within group share (because they affect 
the relative utilities of the different options), and platform j’s software (because, as we 
show in our modified supply equation, they affect software providers’ incentives to 
supply games to platform j).  However, these instruments should be uncorrelated with the 
error in the demand equation because that error term is literally the unobserved utility of 
platform j in a given month which is independent of the characteristics of other offerings.  
Note that all of these instruments vary over time for a given platform (and are therefore 
not subsumed in the platform fixed effects) because the mix of platforms in the market 
changes with entry and exit.  Note as well that the endogeneity concerns discussed here 
are likely to be considerably less severe in specifications that include platform-age fixed 
effects since these allow the unobserved quality of a platform to change in each year of 
its “life”. 
  
ii. Software Supply 
 The installed base variables may be endogenous in the software supply equation.  
As above, this endogeneity problem will result if there is serial correlation in the error 
 18
term.  Specifically, a high value of will stimulate additional games for platform j in 
month t.  This will increase the utility and sales of platform j that month which will 
increase the installed base of platform j in month t+1.  If is correlated with , then 
Platform IB will be endogenous.  Because the software available on platform j also 
affects the demand for competing platforms (and hence their installed base), the 
Generation IB terms can be endogenous as well.  To instrument for a platform’s installed 
base, we construct a measure of that platform’s price history by taking the average of its 
price in each month since its launch.  To instrument for the installed base of other 
platforms in a generation, we use the average price history of all competing platforms in 
the generation.  In both cases, we expect that the price histories will be correlated with 
the installed base variables because they influenced sales in prior periods. However, they 
should be unrelated to the error term in the software supply equation since software 
providers care only about current and future installed base (and thus the only avenue by 
which past prices should affect current software availability is through their affect on past 
sales). 
t
jη
1+t
jη tjη
  
IV. Data 
IV. A. Sources of Data 
Our empirical analysis combines several sources of data.  Our data on hardware 
prices and quantities were obtained from the NPD Group, a market research firm.  The 
NPD Group collects data from approximately two dozen of the largest game retailers in 
the United States.  These retailers account for about 65% of the U.S. market.  From this 
data, NPD formulates estimates of figures for the entire U.S. market.  The NPD data 
provides monthly unit and dollar sales of each console with positive sales.  Dollar sales 
are divided by unit sales to obtain an average monthly price for each console.  Our 
hardware data covers the period 1995-2005, inclusive.  We supplement these data with 
information on the technological characteristics and release dates of each console, which 
we collected from a variety of sources including analyst reports, company websites, and 
trade publications. Technological characteristics include processor speed, processor word 
length (8-bit, 16-bit, etc—the basis of most groupings of video game systems), console 
memory capacity, and whether the system was CD-ROM based.  While these 
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characteristics are not separately identified from the platform fixed effects that we 
include in our specifications, they are important because we use them as instruments for 
price. 
 Our main source of data on software is www.mobygames.com. 
www.mobygames.com is a website that seeks to “catalog all relevant information about 
electronic games (computer, console, and arcade) on a game-by-game basis.”18 
MobyGames provides a database of software titles that includes the release date of each 
title, for each platform on which it appears and for each country in which it is released. 
The data also contain the name of the publisher, the genre of the game, and an indication 
of whether it uses content licensed from another party (like a movie studio). This 
database in principle goes back indefinitely in time, and is intended to capture all releases 
from the beginning of each platform’s life.19   
 
IV. B. Variables20
i. Market Shares and Installed Base Measures 
Estimation of the hardware demand equation requires that we construct measures 
of each platform’s share of the total potential market for video game consoles as well as 
its share of the share of the market captured by all of the “inside goods” combined.  
Following Clements and Ohashi (2005), we define the potential market for video games 
consoles in any month to be the number of households with a television (taken from the 
U.S. Census website) less the combined installed base of all active platforms (i.e.: we 
want to subtract a measure of the number of consumer who are not in the market because 
they already own platforms).  The simplest such measure would be the sum of each 
console’s past sales.  We start by constructing this type of platform-level installed base 
measure (Platform IB).  Since six of the ten platforms that we study launch within the 
period of our data, we can construct their past sales simply using the sales figures from 
                                                 
18 See http://www.mobygames.com/info/faq1#a. The information contained in MobyGames’ database is 
provided by the website’s creators as well as from voluntary contributions.  All information submitted to 
MobyGames is checked by the website’s creators. 
19 Its earliest entries are in 1972, for which there are six releases for the Odyssey game system. 
20 Variable names and definitions appear in Table 3a.  Table 3b presents summary statistics. 
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our data. 21  For the other four platforms, we obtained data on their year-end 1994 
installed base from other sources. The year-end installed base figures for the platforms in 
generations three and four come from Shankar and Bayus (2003) while the figure for 
3DO comes from an analyst report.  For these four platforms, we construct Platform IB 
by combining these figures with the NPD sales data.  Note that for each platform, we 
truncate the time series in the month that its sales first fall under 1000, defining this as a 
platform’s “exit” from the market.   
While we could use this Platform IB measure in our construction of the total 
potential market, it presents a problem. In particular, this approach does not allow users 
of an old platform to gradually re-enter the market; rather, when an old platform “exits” 
the market by having its sales fall below 1000 in a month, it yields a discrete (and 
potentially huge) influx of new customers into the “potential market.”  We solve this 
problem by modifying the installed base variable based on a depreciation rate.  
Specifically, we calculate each month’s installed base as a fraction of the previous 
month’s installed base plus the previous month’s hardware sales, where the depreciation 
rate varies with the age of the platform.22  We call this variable Depreciated IB.  We 
focus on this particular formulation of the depreciation rate because, practically speaking, 
it yields declines in installed base that roughly coincides for most platforms with their 
exit from the market defined by current sales. We also run robustness checks using 
alternate ways of measuring installed base. 
Having calculated each platform’s depreciated installed base, we then calculate 
the total potential market for video game systems in a month as the number of U.S. 
households with a television minus the sum of Depreciated IB over all active platforms.  
We construct a platform’s market share in a month as its hardware sales divided by the 
total potential market and call this Market Share.  We construct a platform’s within-
group share (Within Group Share) as its hardware sales that month divided by the total 
hardware sales of all active platforms that month.  The share of the outside good (which 
                                                 
21 While Table 2 gives a launch date for Jaguar that predates our sample, its national launch was not until 
the end of 1994, so we ignore sales prior to our data, which begins in January 1995. 
22 The monthly depreciation rate (or rate of reentry into the potential market) is 0.00065 times the age of the 
platform in years. This yields about a 1% re-entry over the course of the first year and about a 7.5% re-
entry rate over the course of a platform’s tenth year. 
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is needed to construct the dependent variable for the demand equation) is calculated as 
one minus the combined market shares of all of the active consoles in a month.   
 Our software supply equation includes measures of both a platform’s own 
installed base and the installed base of the other platforms in its generation.  We use 
Platform IB in the software supply equation and calculate Generation IB as the sum of 
Platform IB over the competing platform’s in a generation.   
 
ii. Console Characteristics  
 Because our hardware demand equation includes console fixed effects, non-time 
varying console characteristics (such as technical specifications) are not separately 
identified.  The three time-varying characteristics that we include in the demand model 
are price, age and, of course, software availability.  We construct the average price of 
each console in each month (Price) by dividing the console’s dollar sales by its unit sales.  
We measure the age of a platform as the number of months that have past since the 
platform’s U.S. launch month.  We call this variable Platform Age.  In some 
specifications, we measure a platform’s age in years since its U.S. launch.  While the age 
of a console may not directly affect consumers’ utility, we expect that it matters 
indirectly.  For example, consumers may use console age to predict how many more new 
games may be released for that console, or they may use it to predict when the next 
generation of machines may be launched.  As mentioned above, age may also capture the 
availability of complementary products other than software, such gaming magazines or 
websites. 
 We use the MobyGames data to measure the cumulative amount of software 
available on a console in a month.  Our primary measure of software availability is 
simply the sum - from the platform’s release date up through the present month - of all 
titles released on that platform in the US.  We call this variable # of Titles.  This variable 
appears on the right-hand side of the demand equation and as the dependent variable in 
the supply equation.  More detailed information on what software titles were actually 
selling at any point in time would likely yield a more accurate portrayal of the software 
available to consumers at the time they made their hardware choice.  While we do not 
have this information for the entire time period covered by our hardware data, we do have 
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monthly sales for each game title 1995-2001.23  As we explain in Section VI, we try to 
exploit this software sales data in two ways.   
 
V. Results 
 This section presents our empirical results.  It proceeds in several steps.  First, we 
present the results of the hardware demand equation and use the logit market share 
equations to illustrate the differential impact of exclusive and non-exclusive software 
titles on hardware demand.  We then present the results of the software supply equation 
and show that, over time, positive cross-platform (within-generation) network effects 
arise.  That is, we find that, controlling for a platform’s own installed base, in Generation 
6 the installed base of competing platforms stimulates the supply of games for that 
platform.  Together, the results of the hardware demand and software supply equations 
indicate that while platform-specific indirect network effects still exist, generation-wide 
indirect network effects exist as well.  Finally, we conclude this section with an empirical 
exercise that illustrates the effects of having network effects between users of competing 
consoles. 
 
V.A. Hardware Demand Results 
 Tables 4 and 5 present the results of the hardware demand estimation.  All of our 
models include platform fixed effects (except for the final column of Table 4 which 
includes platform-age fixed effects) and calendar month fixed effects.  All specifications 
treat Price, # of Titles and Within Group Share as endogenous.   Recall that the right-
hand side of our model is literally the mean utility of product j in month t and therefore 
the coefficients that we estimate on Price and # of Titles are marginal utilities of these 
attributes.  Thus, the magnitudes of these coefficients are not, on their own, informative; 
however, the ratio of the coefficients can be used as a way to illustrate the relative effects 
of different attributes.   
 The first three columns of Table 4 estimate the hardware demand model using 
alternate ways of controlling for platform age.  Because both price and software 
                                                 
23 This data is also from the NPD Group.  Software sales are by platform.  Thus, if a given title is available 
on multiple hardware platforms, we know the sales on each platform. 
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availability will change with age, it is important to carefully control for any other ways in 
which platform age may affect the demand for a particular platform.  In (4-1), we include 
the linear age variable and its square, in (4-2) we include fixed effects for age in years 
and in (4-3) we include fixed effects for age in months.    Each of these specifications 
yields quite similar results.  In particular, we find that higher prices lower consumers’ 
utility from a platform while greater software availability increase their utility.  The 
relative magnitudes of the coefficients in (4-3) indicate that decreasing the hardware price 
by $10 has roughly the same effect on utility as introducing 20 new exclusive games.  As 
expected, the coefficient on log(Within Group Share) lies between zero and one and 
ranges from 0.54 to 0.65.  This suggests that the “inside products” are indeed closer 
substitutes for each other than for the outside good. 
 As described in Section III, if there are unobserved shocks to the quality of a 
platform that persist for more than one month, then the software variable may be 
endogenous.  Of course, a second implication of unobserved changes in quality that 
persist over time is that error terms in the hardware demand equation will be serially 
correlated.  To account for this, we do two things.  First, in the fourth column of Table 4, 
we re-estimate (4-3) using standard errors that are robust to arbitrary autocorrelation.  
The point estimates do not change, but the standard errors increase and the significance 
of the coefficients on Price and # of Titles is reduced.  Second, in (4-5) we replace the 
platform and age fixed effects with platform-age effects.  Intuitively, these estimate the 
unobserved quality of each platform in each year of its life (i.e., rather than estimate one 
level of unobserved quality for, say, the Sony PlayStation, we now estimate ten different 
levels).  These fixed effects will clearly do a better job of capturing unobserved and 
potentially persistent changes in quality that occur at different points in a platform’s life; 
moreover, the error term in the hardware demand equation is much less likely to exhibit 
serial correlation with their inclusion.  The disadvantage of these fixed effects, however, 
is that they are more demanding of the data in the sense that we can only identify the 
effects of the price and software variables from variation in these variables within a year 
for a given platform (and there are many platform-ages in which there is very little 
variation in one or both of these variables).  When we include these fixed effects, we 
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again find a positive and significant effect of software availability on hardware demand 
though the effect of price is not significant. 
Having obtained estimates of the marginal utility of software, we can now 
illustrate the differential impact of exclusive and nonexclusive titles on hardware 
demand. As described in Section III, there is no need to distinguish exclusive and 
nonexclusive software in the mean utility expressions.  Rather, the logit demand system 
accounts for the fact that a non-exclusive game affects the utility of each platform for 
which it is available.  Using the nested logit market share equations and the estimates 
from specification (4-3), we compare the effects on demand of ten additional exclusive 
games and ten additional non-exclusive games.  We do this in the following way. First, 
we back out the mean utility implied by our estimates for each observation. We then use 
this to calculate the implied shares of the total market. Then, we recalculate the implied 
share for each platform-month under the assumption that that platform’s mean utility has 
increased through the addition of 10 software titles (i.e., its mean utility is increased by 
10 times the coefficient on # of Titles in specification (4-3)). We then calculate the 
resulting change in share and average these changes over all observations.  
The average share of the total market for all platform-month observations is 
0.00217; given the roughly 100 million households in the total potential market, this 
amounts to about 217,000 units. The calculation described above implies that, on 
average, the introduction of ten exclusive games increases a platform’s share of the 
potential market by 0.000305, or about 30,500 units per month. We can compare this 
with the estimated effect of adding ten games that are compatible with all available 
hardware platforms.  Such an addition increases each firm’s predicted share of the 
potential market by only 0.000142, or about 14,200 units. That is, the relationship 
between hardware demand and exclusive titles is on average a little over two times 
stronger than the relationship between hardware demand and titles available on all 
platforms.  
 In Table 5, we estimate specification (4-2) of our demand model using two 
alternate software measures that attempt to capture differences in the quality of games.24  
                                                 
24 One could also check for robustness to different assumptions on the inter-generational compatibility 
between platforms from the same provider. In particular, the PlayStation 2 can play PlayStation 1 games, 
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First, we construct a weighted software measure that exploits the software sales data that 
we have for the years 1995-2001.  Specifically, we estimate a software sales equation for 
each title for which we have the sales data.  The right-hand side variables of this equation 
include a series of dummy variables capturing the size of the publisher, a dummy variable 
for whether the title is part of a series (i.e., a sequel to a previously released game), a 
dummy variable for whether the title includes licensed content, and dummy variables 
indicating whether the game is part of one of four major franchise games (Zelda, Mario 
Brothers, Donkey Kong, and Sonic the Hedgehog).25  We use the coefficient estimates 
from the sales equation to calculate the predicted sales of all titles in our MobyGames 
database.  We then scale these sales projections by the number of consoles sold for each 
platform (this has a similar effect to including platform fixed effects, but has the benefit 
that it allows projections to platforms not yet introduced during this period). Thus, our 
projected sales variable is measured as dollars per console.26  These projected sales are 
summed up for each platform to create a weighted software availability measure that can 
be used in place of the simple count of titles described above.  We call this variable 
Weighted # of Titles.  (5-1) replaces the simple # of Titles variable with Weighted # of 
Titles.  When we include this quality-adjusted measure of software, we again find a 
positive and statistically significant effect of software on utility.   
 In (5-2), we try to capture software quality in a more direct way.  We restrict our 
sample to the period for which we have the software sales data (1995-2001) and construct 
a software variable that measures the number of titles on a platform in a month that 
experience positive sales.27  We again find a positive and statistically significant effect of 
software on utility. 
                                                                                                                                                 
though these are not counted in the # of Titles variable for PlayStation 2. However, this is irrelevant since 
all our specifications contain platform fixed effects, which absorb this fixed increase in titles available on 
PlayStation 2. 
25 We also tried including genre dummies but these proved insignificant. We have replicated the results 
using publisher dummies in this regression and obtained similar results. We present results that use the 
publisher size dummy variables because this specification allows us to project sales for a larger set of titles 
(i.e., we can still project sales for games that are published by firms that do not exist during the period for 
which we have software sales data). 
26 For example, a value of one would represent a game that was projected to sell to 2% of the market (at its 
size at maturity) at $50, yielding $1 average revenue per console sold. 
27We estimate this regression using only the platforms in generations 5 and 6 because these are the 
platforms launched during or just before the period for which we have this data. Software launches for 
extremely mature platforms are likely to exhibit different patterns. 
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 V.B. Software Supply Results 
 This section presents the estimates from our software supply equation.  In all 
specifications, the dependent variable is # of Titles.  All models include platform fixed 
effects and either year or month fixed effects (to control for general trends on the 
software side of the market).  Since we cannot include platform, year, and age fixed 
effects, we control for the age of platform using the square and cube of Age in Months.  
The installed base variables are treated as endogenous in all specifications.   
 In the first column of Table 6, we estimate the relationship between the supply of 
software for a video game platform and that platform’s installed base of hardware.  As 
expected, we find that a positive relationship.  Together with the positive effect of 
software on hardware demand, the positive coefficient on Platform IB establishes the 
presence of platform-specific indirect network effects.   
 The most interesting and novel of our software supply results is the relationship 
between the supply of games for a platform and the installed base of its competitors.  In 
the second column of Table 6, we add Generation IB - recall that this variable measures 
the combined installed base of competing platforms in a generation.  When we do not 
allow the coefficient on this variable to change by generation, we find that Generation IB 
has a negative and significant effect on the # of Titles.  That is, increasing the installed 
base of a platform’s competitors lowers the supply of games for that platform.  As 
discussed in Section III, the finding of a negative coefficient on Generation IB in a 
reduced-form model should not be surprising.   
In specifications (6-3) – (6-5) in Table 6, we allow the relationship between 
Generation IB and # of Titles to change over successive generations.  We implement this 
by interacting Generation IB with dummies for Generations four through six.  Since we 
have data on only one platform in Generation three (the NES), we cannot estimate a 
coefficient on Generation IB for that generation.28    
We incorporate these additional interactions into the model of (6-2) and present 
the results as specification (6-3).  The coefficients on all three of the Generation IB terms 
                                                 
28 To instrument for these interactions with Generation IB, we interact our instruments (described in 
Section III.C) with Generation dummies. 
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are significantly different from zero.  Moreover, they are monotonically increasing over 
successive generations.  The coefficients imply that, in Generation four, increases in the 
installed base of its competitors lower the supply of games to a platform.  In Generation 
five, the effect is still negative but an order of magnitude smaller.  Finally, in Generation 
six, increases in its competitors’ installed base stimulate the supply of software for a 
platform. The magnitude of this effect is reasonably large with the point estimates in (6-
3) implying that an increase in rivals’ combined installed base is worth, strictly in terms 
of software availability for a platform, about one quarter of what an increase in one’s own 
installed base is worth.  
 The positive coefficient on Generation IB*Generation-6 establishes the existence 
of indirect network effect that are operating at the generation level, rather than platform 
level.  The hardware demand estimates establish that the demand for a platform is 
increasing in the availability of software for that platform, and the software supply 
estimates establish that in Generation six the availability of software for a platform is 
increasing in the hardware sales of the entire generation.  Thus, users of competing video 
game platforms create positive externalities for each other within a generation.  These 
results suggest that a consumer’s utility of purchasing a Microsoft Xbox is not only 
increasing in the number of other users of the Xbox but also in the number of users of the 
PlayStation2 because, with high costs of developing common content and low enough 
porting costs, their combined size will induce software providers to write games that are 
released on both platforms.  Thus, the scope of indirect network effects in this industry 
has changed. 
 The remaining columns of Table 6 estimate slight variations on (6-3).  Column 
four replaces the year fixed effects with month fixed effects and column five adjusts the 
standard errors for arbitrary autocorrelation.  The supply results are quite robust to both 
of these specification changes. 
  
V.C. Implications of the Estimates 
We can illustrate the implications of the change in the scope of indirect network 
effects in this industry by tracing out the effect on hardware sales of an exogenous 
change in software availability.  In markets with indirect network effects, an exogenous 
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increase in software for a platform has both a direct effect on hardware demand 
(increasing utility and sales) and an indirect effect (since this direct effect stimulates the 
provision of additional software, which further increases utility and sales).  This latter 
effect—which is sometimes called the “virtuous cycle”—illustrates how, in markets with 
network effects, the “strong get stronger” and the “weak get weaker” (Shapiro and Varian 
(1999)). However, once network effects exist across users of competing platforms, this 
cycle is weakened.  In particular, an increase in (exclusive or non-exclusive) software for 
a platform still increases the installed base of that platform, which still increases the 
supply of games for that platform, but now it also increases the supply of games for 
competing platforms.  Thus, in this scenario, one could say that the strong may get 
stronger but the weak may not get as weak as they would have absent this cross-platform 
positive spillover.   
Although we do not estimate a dynamic model, we can use the results of our 
demand and supply equations to illustrate one iteration of this cycle under the assumption 
that network effects do not exist across platforms (i.e., using our Generation four estimate 
of the coefficient on Generation IB) and under the assumption that network effects do 
exist across platforms (i.e., using our Generation six coefficient on Generation IB).  We 
do this by calculating the effects of a hypothetical addition of 10 exclusive titles for 
PlayStation 2. We do this separately (not cumulatively) for each month from January 
2004 onward, which is the period in which PS2, GameCube, and Xbox are the three 
competing platforms in generation 6, and then present the average effects over these 
months. 
We calculate these effects as follows. We begin with the same calculation 
employed in the illustration of the demand estimates, in which we back out implied mean 
utilities and calculate predicted shares of the total market. We then increase 
PlayStation2’s mean utility to reflect the addition of ten new games.  We make no 
changes to software measures of the other platforms, consistent with the interpretation 
that these software titles are exclusive to PlayStation2. We then recalculate the firms’ 
predicted market shares based on these new mean utilities, calculate the difference from 
the original implied share, and multiply this by the size of the potential market. We refer 
to this increase in market share as the direct effect of the increase in software for the 
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PlayStaion2, and we report it in the first row of Table 7. This row demonstrates two 
consequences of an increase in software for PS2. First, the increase in software diverts 
sales from both of the other platforms to PS2. Second, total sales grow since the sum of 
the numbers in this row is positive; that is, PS2 gains more sales than XBox and 
GameCube lose. 
We then use the estimates from our software equation to predict how the number 
of titles provided on each platform changes as a result of the installed base changes that 
result from the sales changes reported in the first row. This takes into account both the 
change in each platform’s own installed base and the change in other platforms’ installed 
base. Thus, the implied effect on software provision will vary depending on whether we 
use the Generation 4 or Generation 6 estimates. Finally, we use this implied change in 
software availability to calculate the indirect effect on hardware sales of the initial 
hypothetical increase in exclusive titles for PS2. The second and third row of Table 7 
follow this exercise through using the Generation 4 estimates—that is, the estimates that 
show a negative cross-platform spillover. The fourth and fifth rows of Table 7 follow the 
exercise through with the Generation 6 estimates, which show a positive cross-platform 
spillover.  
The contrast in these calculations using Generation 4 and Generation 6 estimates 
helps make concrete the implications of the change in the scope of indirect network 
effects that we find.  Note that in both scenarios (rows two and four) the effect of the 
diversion of hardware sales to PS2 is to stimulate additional software provision for PS2 
and to reduce software availability for the other two platforms. This is one sense in which 
the indirect network effects lead the strong to get stronger and the weak to get weaker—
an exogenous increase in software for one platform leads to both additional software for 
that platform and a decrease in software for other platforms. However, the magnitudes of 
the effects are quite different between the two scenarios. The broadening of the network 
effect in moving from Generation 4 estimates to Generation 6 estimates cuts the implied 
follow-on increase in software for PS2 in half, from 0.35 titles to 0.18 titles. However, 
the negative effect on the other platforms is cut in both cases by more than a factor of 15 
(-0.32 to -0.02 and -0.28 to -0.005). In this sense, the broadening of the network effects 
leads to a scenario in which the strong still get stronger, but the weak do not suffer nearly 
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the same penalty from further increases in the leader’s sales. This is, of course, precisely 
because of the positive spillover that the leader’s increased sales creates in the way of 
software provision for the smaller platforms. 
The third and fifth rows of Table 7 show how this effect on follow-on software 
provision translates into an indirect effect on hardware sales. The numbers there exhibit a 
similar pattern: the broadening of network effects in Generation 6 somewhat weakens the 
indirect benefit to the leader but dramatically reduces the penalty to the weaker firms. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
In this paper we investigate the scope of indirect network effects in the home 
video game industry and argue that, despite the fact that all home video game systems are 
incompatible, indirect network effects increasingly exist between users of rival systems.  
This is because multi-platform releases (or non-exclusive software titles) allow software 
publishers to spread the fixed costs of game development over users of competing 
platforms.  Over time, software publishers’ incentives for multi-platform releases have 
increased as the fixed development costs of common content have soared, while the fixed 
costs of porting a game to additional platforms have fallen.  Both of these increase the 
relative profitability of non-exclusive software releases, which in turn lead to the 
presence of cross-platform indirect network effects.  
 Our empirical results support this interpretation.  We estimate a model of 
hardware demand and software supply that indicates that while platform-specific indirect 
network effects exist, in recent years generation-wide indirect network effects have also 
come to exist.  Thus, the scope of indirect network effects has changed.  We also carry 
out a simple illustrative exercise that shows why the presence of positive cross-platform 
spillovers weakens the benefit that a platform gets from a strategy aimed at stimulating 
demand, such as the introduction of new software.  While we do not estimate a dynamic 
model, we believe that our findings are suggestive of why, in recent generations, this 
industry has not been dominated by any single console.  Furthermore, our results indicate 
that hardware compatibility is not the only factor affecting the scope of network effects in 
an industry.  Rather, non-exclusive software creates another avenue by which cross-
platform spillovers can arise, as changes in software development and porting technology 
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increase the attractiveness of expanding the potential market through multi-platform 
releases. 
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Figure 1 
Long-Run Installed Base Market Share, by Generation 
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Source: Generation 3, Power Play (A); Generation 4, Power Play (B); Generations 5 and 
6, NPD data. 
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Figure 2 
Game Development Costs 
 
 
 
 
Source: http://arstechnica.com/articles/paedia/hardware/crossplatform.ars/2 
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Table 1 
Generations of the U.S. Modern Home Video Game Industry 
 
 
 U.S. Launch Date Platform Parent Hardware Technological Characteristics 
   CPU bits MHZ RAM (M bytes)
Generation 3      
NES October 1985 Nintendo 8 1.8 0.002 
      
Generation 4      
Super NES August 1991 Nintendo 16 3.6 0.128 
Genesis August 1989 Sega 16 7.6 0.064 
      
Generation 5      
N64 September 1996 Nintendo 64 93.75 36 
Saturn May 1995 Sega 32 28 4 
PlayStation September 1995 Sony 32 33.87 2 
3DO October 1993 3DO 32 12.5 2 
Jaguar November 1993 Atari 32 26.59 2 
      
Generation 6      
GameCube November 2001 Nintendo 128 485 24 
Dreamcast September 1999 Sega 128 200 16 
PlayStation2 October 2000 Sony 128 300 32 
Xbox November 2001 Microsoft Intel Pentium II 733 64 
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Table 2A 
Changes in Software Characteristics, by Generation 
 
 Generation1
 All 3 4 5 6 
# of Titles 3544 585 622 1124 1225 
      
Game Characteristics      
% Exclusive2 73% 88% 71% 80% 61% 
% Exclusive, Third-Party Titles Only 68% 88% 65% 77% 54% 
% In-House 21% 25% 21% 23% 16% 
% Utilizing Licensed Content 25% 18% 24% 26% 27% 
Size of Publisher, Measured by # of Titles per 
Publisher (independent publishers only) 30 10 18 33 39 
1Data are at the title level.  Title’s generation is determined by the first platform on which it is released.  273 of the titles in our sample 
(7.7%) are, at some point, released on platforms in different generations.  For the purpose of this table, these titles are counted in the 
generation of the first platform on which they are released. 
2Exclusive is defined as never being released on any other platform 
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Table 2B 
Software Characteristics, by Platform 
 
 # Titles1 % Exclusive 
% Exclusive, 
Third-Party 
Titles Only 
% Licensed 
Generation 3     
NES 531 84% 82% 21% 
Sega Master System2 100 66% 40% 13% 
     
Generation 4     
Super NES 428 51% 47% 28% 
Genesis 441 50% 41% 27% 
     
Generation 5     
N64 246 61% 52% 37% 
Saturn 152 37% 20% 24% 
PlayStation 871 69% 65% 28% 
3DO 85 59% 59% 11% 
Jaguar 67 64% 38% 15% 
     
Generation 6     
GameCube 378 26% 17% 40% 
Dreamcast 211 57% 49% 25% 
PlayStation2 832 43% 38% 32% 
Xbox 569 29% 23% 35% 
1Data is at the title-platform level (i.e.: titles that are released on multiple platforms will count for each of those 
platforms). 
2The Sega Master System is included in this table for the purpose of illustrating software trends.  It is not included in 
our estimation sample since it does not have new sales during our sample period, 1995-2005. 
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Table 3A 
Variable Definitions  
 
Variable  Definition Source 
Price Monthly retail price of platform. 2005 dollars NPD data 
# of Titles Cumulative number of software titles that have been released for a particular platform Moby data 
Platform Age Platform’s age in months (0 for month of launch) Authors’ construction 
Platform IB 
 
The installed base of a given platform, calculated as its cumulative 
sales of hardware, in thousands 
NPD data and authors’ 
construction 
Generation IB 
 
The sum of the installed bases of all other platforms in a given 
generation, in thousands 
NPD data and authors’ 
construction 
 
 
 
Table 3B 
Summary Statistics 
 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Max 
log(market sharej/market share0) 716 -7.40 2.11 -14.71 -3.25 
log(within_group_sharej) 716 -2.58 1.92 -9.04 -.39 
Price 716 162.95 112.64 22.18 942.67 
# of Titles  716 322.80 242.98 2 871 
Platform Age (months) 716 49.54       36.41 0 138 
Platform IB (thousands) 716 11115.08 9734.29 0 32174.05 
Generation IB (thousands) 716 13111.8 11422.48 0 48161 
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Table 4 
Hardware Demand  
 
Dependent Variable log(sj/so) 
Age Control 
Age (months) & 
Age (months)2
Age (years) 
Fixed Effects Age (months) Fixed Effects 
Platform-Age 
Fixed Effects 
 (4-1) (4-2) (4-3) (4-4) (4-5) 
      
Price -0.0006 -0.0016 -0.0015 -0.0015 -0.0046 
 (0.0006) (0.0007)* (0.0006)** (0.0010) (0.0049) 
      
# of Titles  0.0008 0.0009 0.0007 0.0007 0.0216 
 (0.0004)* (0.0004)* (0.0004)+ (0.0006) (0.0129)+ 
      
log(within_group_sharej) 0.5428 0.6017 0.6509 0.6509 0.9287 
 (0.0715)** (0.0697)** (0.0648)** (0.1030)** (0.3737)* 
      
Observations 716 716 716 716 716 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  All specifications report 2SLS estimates.  All specifications 
include platform and calendar month fixed effects (coefficients not reported).  Coefficients on age variables also not reported.  
All standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity.  Standard errors in (4-4) are also robust to arbitrary 
autocorrelation. 
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Table 5 
Hardware Demand – Alternate Software Measures 
 
Dependent Variable log(sj/so) 
Age Control Age (years) Fixed Effects 
 (5-1) (5-2) 
   
Price -0.0040 -0.0005 
 (0.0013)** (0.0013) 
   
Weighted # of Titles  0.0036  
 (0.0018)*  
   
# of Titles with Positive Sales  0.0023 
  (0.0006)** 
   
log(within_group_sharej) 0.6910 0.5979 
 (0.0465)** (0.1262)** 
   
Observations 716 236 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  All specifications report 2SLS 
estimates.  All specifications include platform and calendar month fixed effects (coefficients not 
reported).  All standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary 
autocorrelation.  Sample in (5-2) excludes years before 1994 or after 2000 and excludes the 
following platforms: NES, SNES, Genesis, Xbox and Genesis. 
 
 42
Table 6 
Software Supply 
 
Dependent Variable # of Titles 
Estimation Method IV IV IV IV IV 
Time Control 
Year Fixed 
Effects 
Year Fixed 
Effects 
Year Fixed 
Effects 
Month Fixed 
Effects 
Month Fixed 
Effects 
 (6-1) (6-2) (6-3) (6-4) (6-5) 
      
Platform IB (000s) 0.0103 0.0320 0.0234 0.0241 0.0241 
 (0.0039)** (0.0070)** (0.0007)** (0.0007)** (0.0013)** 
      
Generation IB (000s)  -0.0130    
  (0.0043)**    
      
Generation IB*Generation=4   -0.0482 -0.0388 -0.0388 
   (0.0064)** (0.0053)** (0.0094)** 
      
Generation IB*Generation=5   -0.0047 -0.0039 -0.0039 
   (0.0015)** (0.0014)** (0.0025) 
      
Generation IB*Generation=6   0.0056 0.0049 0.0049 
   (0.0010)** (0.0010)** (0.0019)* 
      
Observations 652 652 652 652 652 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  All specifications include platform fixed effects and 
platform age (in months) squared and cubed (coefficients on not reported).  (6-1) – (6-3) also include calendar month 
fixed effects.  All standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity.  Standard errors in (6-5) are also robust to 
arbitrary autocorrelation. 
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Table 7 
Direct and Indirect Effects of 10 Additional Exclusive Titles for PlayStation2 
 
 
 
 PS2 Xbox GameCube 
Direct increase in hardware sales 8399 -2216 -1459 
Generation 4 estimates    
Resulting increase in software titles 0.35 -0.32 -0.28 
Indirect increase in hardware sales 719 -415 -235 
Generation 6 estimates    
Resulting increase in software titles 0.18 -0.02 -0.005 
Indirect increase in hardware sales 285 -92 -49 
 
 
 
 44
